Iran and Oman are reportedly finalizing a deal to control the Strait of Hormuz, charging ships fees for passage, and potentially blocking ships from “hostile countries.” Trump resumed bombing in early July to prevent Iran from doing just that, and President Donald Trump has flitted between claiming the United States will control Hormuz and charge tolls, pretending the strait is already open and threatening to “hit very hard” if Iran doesn’t fully open it soon. 

Yet Trump and other top U.S. officials, such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, are touting the Iran-Oman talks as diplomatic progress, indicating they’re going to accept a deal on Iran’s terms. 

This would arguably be America’s most blatant loss in war ever, especially for a war the U.S. started. 

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In February, before Trump started the war, Hormuz was open, treated as an international waterway, free to all. The U.S. was widely considered the dominant military power in the region. Gulf Arab states — Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait — made U.S. dominance the basis of their national security and economic strategies. And Iran was engaged in talks over its nuclear program, albeit unlikely to make significant concessions.

On June 17, after a lot of bombing, some extreme threats and a couple of ceasefires, the U.S. signed a memorandum of understanding with Iran that was mostly an American surrender. The deal front-loaded sanctions relief and other economic benefits for Iran, and punted on all U.S. war aims. Iran agreed to nonspecified nuclear talks in the future, which the U.S. had before attacking. The written document requires both parties not to threaten each other (Trump violated that almost right away) and committed Israel to end operations in Lebanon (which they never agreed to, and wouldn’t). It effectively acknowledged Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz, saying Iran would “make arrangements” to manage it with Oman, and wouldn’t charge any fees “for 60 days only.”

But Hormuz did partially open, with daily crossings the highest in months (though still not to prewar levels). Oil prices dropped.

But the U.S. acted as if it was following a different deal in Trump’s imagination. 

Besides breaking the MOU with threats, Trump repeatedly lied about its contents, falsely claiming Iran made nuclear concessions, opened Hormuz and gave the U.S. “just about everything.” With U.S. encouragement, some ships transited Hormuz outside Iranian waters, hugging Oman’s coast. Then Iran shot at a few to assert control.

So Trump started bombing again. Again, Iran blocked the strait and fired missiles and drones at U.S. regional partners, hitting civilian infrastructure, U.S. bases and other targets. 

Now that this round appears over, it’s clear Trump worsened America’s position, failing to achieve any of his goals and strengthening Iran’s hand.

The U.S. used up even more precision attack missiles and air defense interceptors, creating shortages. That limits America’s capabilities, encourages U.S. adversaries and — due to production bottlenecks — won’t be easily solved.

Iran again showed it can attack ships around Hormuz, despite U.S. efforts to prevent it. Now Iran has Oman — which was working with the U.S. before Trump restarted bombing — on board with its plan to control the strait. Even at the low end of proposed tolls, 3% per ship, Iran would gain tens of billions of dollars in annual revenue.

The war widened, with Iran-backed militias getting more involved. Iraqi groups fired drones into Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. and Saudis launched airstrikes in Iraq. The Yemen-based Houthis are firing at Red Sea shipping and into Saudi Arabia. The Saudis are reportedly planning an offensive against them.

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Saudi leader Mohammed bin Salman reportedly urged Trump against a larger attack on Iran, shifting under Iranian threat from his earlier pro-war stance. That implies the Saudis are begrudgingly open to paying tolls to their rival Iran. It’s a serious vote of no confidence in the U.S.-led regional security architecture — a sentiment likely shared in other Arab capitals.

And U.S. troops took additional casualties, bringing the total from the war to 18 killed and more than 600 injured.

It’s true the U.S. killed enemy personnel and destroyed a lot of the Iranian government’s stuff. But that’s tactical, not strategic. All these setbacks amount to losing, no matter how favorable the loss-exchange ratio in combat.

Trump’s options remain: (1) humiliating surrender — losing freedom of navigation, accepting Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz and allowing it to collect tolls — essentially a worse version of the MOU, the humiliation Trump couldn’t tolerate once he realized he couldn’t escape the commitments or sell lies about it; or (2) military escalation, perhaps even ground operations.

He’s gotten the U.S. into a terrible position, and has waffled between surrender and war, instead of committing to either. Now he appears out of ideas, repeating moves that already failed.

An empowered, more hard-line Iran, acknowledged as the premier power of the Persian Gulf, and with a big new stream of revenue might be less bad than a costly ground operation or more bombing just to get to the same result.

He’s tried threatening a campaign against civilian infrastructure at least seven times, and keeps not doing it. That’s better than unleashing war crimes that probably wouldn’t achieve anything, but it’s worse than doing nothing, since the threat-then-fold cycle saps him of credibility. Now no threat will work even if Trump means it. He’s bluffed too much.

He’s tried bombing to make the Iranian regime collapse, and when that failed, he tried bombing to force Iran to make concessions — which also failed.

He’s floated ground operations, but that’d be a terrible idea. For one, U.S. troops on Iranian soil would be targets for Iranian forces deeper in the large, mountainous country. Fortunately, Trump seems afraid of that, and though he’s dropped a lot of bombs this term, he hasn’t ordered any ground operations larger than a special forces raid.

He can’t sue Iran or declare bankruptcy, like in business. He can’t bully them like some of his domestic targets. Interstate war is the highest level of competition — there’s no system to manipulate, no entity that can bail him out.

That leaves surrender. For real this time. That looks to be the only way he can stabilize the situation enough to avoid the worst economic scenarios, and the only chance he has of lowering gas prices in time for the midterms.

An empowered, more hard-line Iran, acknowledged as the premier power of the Persian Gulf, and with a big new stream of revenue might be less bad than a costly ground operation or more bombing just to get to the same result. But it’s still really bad.

Yet at this point, it’s probably the least-worst option. Though it depends on Trump accepting that he’s a world historical loser, rather than thinking another show of force will change circumstances in his favor, or at least make him temporarily feel strong.

Nicholas Grossman

Nicholas Grossman is a political science professor at the University of Illinois, editor of Arc Digital and the author of “Drones and Terrorism.”